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Abstract—Industrial control systems (ICSs) are, at present,
extremely vulnerable to cyber attack because they are ho-
mogenous and interconnected. Mitigating solutions are urgently
required because systems breaches can feasibly lead to fatalities.
In this paper we propose the deployment of permuted code
onto Physically Unclonable Unique Processors in order to resist
common cyber attacks. We present our proposal and explain how
it would resist attacks from hostile agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks on traditional information technology (IT)
systems steal or destroy information, which is damaging
enough, and has financial implications. Nowadays, Industrial
Control Systems (ICSs) are threatened by attacks similar to
those against traditional IT used in companies to support office
work. Attacks on ICSs can lead to tangible, physical side
effects, which could potentially be cataclysmic.
The reason for this is that ICSs measure and control phys-
ical processes. Examples are the automation of processes in
factories, the control of large systems in industrial production,
or coordination of critical infrastructures. The use of Stuxnet
to sabotage the Iranian Nuclear programme [1] revealed the
latent vulnerabilities of ICSs. An unknown agent introduced
malware into the system by plugging in a thumb drive which
then installed the malware. It propagated itself across the plant
and sabotaged the plant’s functioning so that severe damage
resulted.
Since ICSs run many kinds of critical systems it is vital
to find a way to make these systems more resilient to cyber
attack. The Stuxnet attack did not result in any fatalities, but
one can easily imagine attacks on other systems leading to
multiple fatalities were hostile agents to be able to take control
over them.
In this paper we propose combining two techniques to
address the threat: (1) the use of physically unencodable
unique processors, and (2) permuted operator tables. The
former ensures that software will not run on any but the
specific processor it was produced for. The latter ensures that
even if one particular system is compromised, it would not be
possible for the code to propagate itself with ease, which has
been the case for malware thus far.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICSs)
Cyber attackers targeting ICSs normally face two different
scenarios [2]:
(a) The ICS is directly connected to the Internet. In this case,
the device is usually attacked directly. This means attackers
try to exploit vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the Operating
System (OS) or maybe the configuration interface which is
accessible via a web server running on the device itself. Other
threats are similar to those on any other device that has direct
internet access, like, for example, denial of service attacks
(DoS).
(b) If the ICS cannot be reached over the Internet, attackers
try to infiltrate the traditional office IT of the target company
in order to build sort of a beach head. This is achieved by
common attack techniques, e.g. by spear-phishing or even
social engineering. From here, the attacker gathers more
information about the network and the attached devices, tries
to find vulnerabilities and exploits these to attack ICSs. The
already mentioned Stuxnet worm is a primary example of this
scenario [3].
It is not trivial to resist attacks against ICSs since the
techniques used to defend against traditional attacks on of-
fice IT systems are not fit for purpose due to the special
requirements of ICSs. ICSs are generally time-critical and
must meet hard or soft real-time requirements [4]. The outage
of ICSs is unacceptable because this would halt production.
Forced errors in an ICS can result in malfunctions of robots,
conveyor belts etc. which could lead to severe injury or even
the loss of life. Therefore, ICSs must have some kind of
fault tolerance. ICSs can also be used in environments with
restricted accessibility, e.g. in vacuo or when using toxic
gases, and this complicates physical access to devices. ICS-
based plants are usually designed to work for years without
interruption, which means that the systems used to control the
production process are expected to function properly for at
least 15 to 20 years.
B. Physical Unclonable Functions
Software developed for a particular OS will run on any other
system with that OS, regardless of the underlying hardware.
Software can be updated by a manufacturer, and such updates
propagated to all systems without individual installation. At-
tackers exploit this very characteristic to install their malware
on entire plants. Any authentication of the entity installing
updates is achieved by software, usually using passwords.
Given the ease with which attackers gain access to passwords
they do not constitute a significant barrier. Some systems
make use of hardware authentication, but these are easily
compromised if an attacker gains access to a device.
Having an individual inimitable feature to unmistakeably
identify individual devices would address this vulnerability.
Such devices would also be able to distinguish between
rightful access by parties with a profound knowledge of
these features and unauthorised connection attempts by hostile
agents. One possibility is to equip devices with physical
unclonable functions (PUFs). PUFs are hardware entities that
use device-specific features (based on natural variations in the
production process) to generate unpredictable device-specific
responses to incoming challenges. These challenge-response
pairs are unique for each PUF, since the production parameters
are fragile and impractical to replicate. It is also possible to
design PUFs in such a way that simulation of the behaviour
of a given PUF on a general purpose computer is impossible.
Similar to biometrics, this inherent structure, as the foun-
dation of any PUF-scheme, can act as a hardware fingerprint
of single electronic devices or even distinct chips. PUFs are
functions in that they accept inputs and use their unique
fingerprints to derive unpredictable device-specific responses
to incoming challenges. Since this response derivation should
not be invertible. Pappu et al. [5] suggested the name Physical
One-Way Functions (POWF) for these, and Gassend [6] called
them Physically Random Functions (PRF) since it should be
impossible to predict responses to given challenges without
using the PUF itself.
The challenge-response behaviour of any PUF could be
described by a function F (C) = R that maps a suitable
challenge C onto a unique and unpredictable response R.
For security applications this function must be mathematically
unclonable. This means no attacker should be able to derive
a function F 0 that describes the mapping for the used set of
challenge-response pairs (C,R). Depending on the scenario
and the exact category of PUF used, an attacker is considered
to be able to gain some knowledge about the PUF. For
example, knowledge of the construction outlay or a limited
subset of corresponding challenge-response pairs of this, or
a similar PUF, without being able to derive an appropriate
function reliably to map any other challenge-response pairs.
Furthermore, PUFs can be constructed in such a way
that reverse engineering, or any attempt to circumvent the
usual challenge-response procedure, will destroy the hardware
fingerprint of the device. If an attacker gets hold of such a
device their only way to approach the PUF would be to feed
it challenges through the designated channels of the device.
C. Strong PUF, Physically Obfuscated Keys and Controlled
PUFs
The number of challenges can vary from very large (so
called “strong PUF”) to rather small or even only one
challenge-response pair (“POKs — Physically Obfuscated
Keys”). Both categories share the concept of a secret derived
from a physically uncloneable structure, however their possible
usage and attack points differ drastically.
For strong PUFs, security emerges from a large set of
challenge-response pairs, which cannot all be readout during
a single access of limited duration nor be guessed at from
any given subset. Using this feature, a database of challenge-
response pairs to one PUF can, for example, authenticate a
holder of this PUF-device as the only one who can successfully
give the right response to a random challenge. One of the first
secure authentication protocols based on this feature was given
by optical PUFs [5]. Attacks on the PUF by creating lists of
challenge-response pairs, however, become infeasible if the
number of pairs becomes too high to create an exhaustive
database in a realistic timespan. For use of strong PUFs
in security applications it is especially necessary that these
entities provide mappings that are not only physically but
also mathematically unclonable for the used set of challenge-
response pairs, since most successful attacks on strong PUFs
are based on modelling attacks and more recently “combine
modelling attacks with extra information obtained from direct
physical PUF measurements or from side channels” [7].
A Physically Obfuscated Key [8], on the other hand, can
substitute for a secret key stored in hardware. It is assumed
that no attacker is able to circumvent the access protocol and
directly read the response. If this can be granted, the secret key
can be used as shared secret key to encrypt communication
to another holder of this key, such as the manufacturer.
In this scenario PUFs constitute a feasible alternative to
ordinary secret keys stored on hardware, since the secret is
not permanently present but is only generated on demand.
Another advantage is the fact that many PUF concepts have a
tamper-evident feature, causing the PUF to show or even be
destroyed at any attempt to manipulate it or record responses
circumventing the access protocol.
In combination with POKs, when the device-specific fea-
tures are used to derive a secret key, so called controlled PUFs
(CPUFs) become important, to prevent an attacker from di-
rectly reading out the POKs response. A CPUF, as introduced
by Gassend et al. [6] and summarised by Maes et al. [8],
is “in fact a mode of operation for a PUF in combination
with other (cryptographic) primitives”. The PUF is, prefer-
ably irremovably, connected to the primitive in a way that
prohibits access to the PUF apart from well defined channels
involving the cryptographic primitive. This can, for example,
mean that all challenges are processed by a hash function
prior to being fed into the PUF, thus preventing the attacker
from exploiting readouts of specific challenges (the equivalent
of chosen plaintext attacks). Another similar approach is to
feed the response from the PUF, after error correction, into
an cryptographic algorithm. Thereby the connection between
challenge and response can be obfuscated and the potential of
being unclonable both in hardware and in modelling can be
enhanced by using CPUFs. A CPUF-scheme can be used as
well to give “multiple personalities” (Maes et al. [8]) to a PUF
by allowing the cryptographic algorithms to accept parameter
as well. For example in combination with a state-of-the-art
block cipher a PUF may process two inputs: an encryption key
and a message. In this way a PUF may serve either as a storage
that provides a unique and unpredictable device-specific secret
key or as generator of messages, which are encoded using a
different key. For this proposed application, POKs in a CPUF
context provide a technique for embedding within a processor
an oracle which manufactures unique cryptographic keys.
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Fig. 1. Controlled POK
The construction of a CPUF from a POK, in combination
with a block cipher, shows similarities with a strong PUF,
in that the CPUF accepts inputs as challenges and gives
responses, which can only be verified by a party in possession
of the secret key. However, in comparison to a strong PUF, this
construction solves the problems of storing a limited number
of challenge-response pairs. Since only the secret key has to
be stored securely a database of all such CPUF devices would
need far less resources.
D. The problem of error correction
Because of the small variations in the structure, the sta-
bility of the responses, especially with respect to varying
environmental factors during readout, has to be carefully taken
into account. Maes et al. [8] and Katzenbeisser et al. [9]
consider options and bounds for environmental factors in
which variation between responses R1 ← F (C), R2 ← F (C)
of a particular challenge on one single PUF (“intra-distance”)
are stable, while on the other hand the difference between
responses R1 ← F1(C), R2 ← F2(C) to the same challenge
on two different PUF instantiations (“inter-distance”) becomes
distinguishably large. In this context it is of major importance
that efficient error correction is accounted for to compensate
the intra-distance noise. Dodis et al. [10] describe error
correction schemes especially for biometric input data. Their
technique even allows error correction of a secret value w by
a public information about w that, while not revealing w, still
allows to restore w from an appropriately close value w0. By
this, it is not necessary to store the data for error correction
inside the PUF, which would oppose many advantages of
the PUF concept. In addition, special protocols like the one
described by Pappu et al. [5] are in themselves error tolerant.
However, if such protocols can be used depends on the
PUF application. Ru¨hrmair et al. [11] especially stressed, that
perfect error correction in the secret key is needed in any
application of POKs.
E. Permuted Code
Cyber attacks deploy attacks that are similar, in many ways,
to attacks on human systems. Viruses and bacteria regularly
seek to attack us, and our immune systems have been designed
to resist such attacks. In nature, viruses tend to be species
specific. A virus will infect cells by binding to particular
proteins presented on the cell wall. This binding tends to be
highly specific so that the binding area on the virus surface
is only able to link to a specific sequence of amino acids.
Because different host species present different amino acid
sequences the ability of the virus to spread to new hosts is
impaired.
In agriculture is it well known that cultivation of mono-
cultures of single strains of a cultivar renders crops more
vulnerable to attack by viruses and other pathogens. Similar
phenomena occur in the computing world. The instruction
set/operating system combinations that are most widely used
are the most vulnerable to viruses.
Infection of a machine by a virus requires :
1) The writing of a tailored virus program exploiting a
known vulnerability on a known category of physical or
virtual machine.
2) Either the deliberate targeted introduction of the virus
onto a specific machine or the spread of the virus through
the general population of machines until it reaches the
target machine.
At first virus spread was limited to machines like PCs with
instruction sets/operating system combinations in widespread
general use (e.g the Intel x86/MSDOS pairing). Critical in-
frastructure computing used a more diverse population of
machines and OS types and was, in consequence, relatively
immune to virus infection. This is changing with the greater
use of standard Instruction Set Processors (ISPs) whether
physical designs or virtual platforms.
The combination of a known OS and a small number of
widely used ISP types means that safety- or mission-critical
systems are much more vulnerable targets for infection. The
infection can be deliberate and targeted as in the case of
Stuxnet or the inadvertent result of the spread of viruses from
the general computer population.
A computer virus is always a program written in some
instruction set. As such, a virus that is targeted at Intel x86
ISP cannot infect machines based on ARM processors. If a
sufficient number of different types of ISPs are in use, the
spread of viruses is inhibited. But the design of a new ISP
with a different instruction set is very costly so that there
are relatively few in existence and each may have a large
population of potentially infectable instantiations.
Our proposal is to introduce into the instruction cache fetch
logic of an ISP, a permutation table. Suppose that the ISP uses
byte codes. The normal cache load sequence goes something
like:
fetch instruction at address X
SEQ
check cache tags for X
if X present return cache[tail(X)]
else
SEQ
temp = mem[X]
PAR
cache[tail(x)] = temp
return temp
We propose introducing an additional stage so that it be-
comes
fetch instruction at address X
SEQ
check cache tags for X
if X present return cache[tail(X)]
else
SEQ
temp1 = mem[X]
temp2= permtab[temp1]
PAR
cache[tail(x)] = temp2
return temp2
The permutation phase performs a mapping from the in-
struction read in to the native code of the processor. The
operation can be relatively easily carried by a 256-entry fast
access table which maps the ordering of the source opcode set
to the ordering of the native instruction set.
This mechanism allows a given hardware architecture to
execute any one out of 256! different possible ISPs.
Machines would have unique instruction sets shared by no
other system. This would effectively make them immune to
viruses spreading in the general population. In principle, an
opponent who knew the permutation table used in a particular
instance could produce a highly targeted virus, but this would
be prevented by the use of PUFs.
The processors in this family could be assembly language,
but not binary language compatible with an existing family
of machines. Provided a modified version of the assembler
was available that took as an additional input an op-code
permutation table, it would be possible to cross compile
applications to the specialised machines a small extra cost.
It would be important that the machines should not have
a local compiler or interpreter that would enable them to
generate code for their own permuted instruction set. This
would prevent the spread of source code viruses.
The permutation mechanism would ensure that any
attempts to use a buffer overflow attack would result in
what was essentially a random sequence of numbers being
interpreted as opcodes. The resulting code would either loop,
or terminate on an illegal instruction almost immediately.
The relative probability of these two occurences is obviously
related to Chaitin’s Ω constant [12], the probability that a
random computer programme will halt. This is in principle
uncomputable, but estimates for the leading digits of it as
a binary fraction can be computed for specific machines.
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Fig. 2. Overal structure of the permuted code processor
Calude et al. [13] report estimates for a simple register
machine where they are able to prove that for a simple
register machine of their specification the first 64 bits of Ω
are
0000001000000100 0001100010000110
1000111111001011 1011101000010000
This being for a machine with 10 possible opcodes, one
of which is a halt instruction. This implies that the great
majority of random programmes go into infinite loops. The
halting probability will probably depend on the proportion
of opcodes that are actually halt or illegal opcodes. It does
not, from the standpoint of preventing deliberate malware or
viruses, matter if the programme loops or crashes. But from
the standpoint of reliability, this would still allow a buffer
overflow vulnerability to cause a crash even though it would
prevent an exploit. For industrial control purposes this would
obviously protect against Stuxnet-type attacks; the attack is
immediately visible, but it would not prevent attacks whose
aim is to crash a machine.
Our proposed architecture is shown in Fig. 2. We assume
that the data and code held in flash memory is in a strongly
encrypted Linux filing system, encrypted using a key generated
by the PUF on the chip. For environments where temperature
made PUFs perhaps unreliable, this could be replaced by a
key on an on-board ROM, but such a solution is second best
for a number of reasons discussed earlier. The data held in
the DRAM is unencrypted but the code is held in permuted
form and as such would not be directly executable. The CPU
is assumed to be a modified Harvard architecture at the low
level with distinct data and instruction caches. The data cache
has direct read/write access to the DRAM, but the instruction
cache accesses the DRAM via an inverse permutation unit.
Given a permuted opcode from the DRAM it translates it to
a plain text opcode before passing it to the cache.
The actual inverse permutation is easily performed by a
lookup table. Let us assume that the opcode field is b bits
wide. A 2b × b bit RAM can perform this task. The contents
of the inverse permutation table are initialised by a permutation
machine fed by a pseudorandom bit stream from a PUF.
The precise algorithmic structure of the permutation ma-
chine is an implementation question, but it should follow a
waterfall principle whereby if a single bit in the output of the
PUF is on statistical grounds likely to change the majority of
the permutation table positions. Here is an example of such
an algorithm in C assuming b = 8.
char t1[256],t2[256];
pm(char *pufstream){
register int i,j,k,t;
for(i=0;i<256;i++) t1[i]=i;
for(i=0,k=0;i<128;i++) {
t=pufstream[k++];
for(j=0;j<256;j++)t2[jˆt]=t1[j];
t=pufstream[k++];
for(j=0;j<256;j++)t1[(j+t)%256]=t2[j];
}
for(j=0;j<256;j++)t2[t1[j]]=j;
}
The buffer t1 is internal to the permutation machine the
buffer t2 is the inverse table in the permutation unit. A stream
of 256 bytes is read from the PUF. At then end an inverse
permutation table is in t2.
F. Related Permutation Work
Many researchers have studied the concept of instruction-set
randomization. Here we consider practical work most similar
to our proposal, and highlight how we intend to improve upon
this existing work.
Barrantes et al. [14] describe a software-only technique
for dynamic code randomization, to provide instruction set
diversity in an attempt to thwart code injection attacks. They
present a proof-of-concept implementation, called Random-
ized Instruction Set Emulation (RISE). This system is based on
Valgrind, the Linux, open-source, dynamic binary translation
framework. Executable code does not require recompilation
or pre-execution modification. Instead RISE scrambles binary
code as it is loaded by the OS, by XORing code bytes
with a cached random number. The code is unscrambled on
a per-instruction basis, during the instruction fetch into the
Valgrind dynamic code cache. Then the unscrambled code
may be executed directly by the underlying processor. RISE
is demonstrated to work on a commodity x86 processor using
the Linux OS. Note that the dynamic binary translation service
provided by Valgrind (which implements the code randomiza-
tion) is a layer on top of the OS, only for application code
execution. The paper reports on tests using standard internet
daemons (Apache web server, etc), and describes how RISE
enables protection against buffer overflow attacks etc. This is
a promising approach, but there are several disadvantages. The
executed application code is slow because of the overhead of
dynamic binary translation, which is implemented entirely in
software. The OS and Valgrind DBT code run unscrambled on
the stock hardware. Thus it might be possible to circumvent
the scrambling process by injecting code into the DBT directly.
Further, there are difficulties when applications store code in
data sections (which are not scrambled). Explicit hard-coded
workarounds are required to handle this problem.
Portokalidis et al. [15] use a similar approach to RISE,
based on the Intel PIN dynamic binary rewriting tool. They
use a database of keys, to randomize every loaded code image
in a different way. Their work has lower runtime overhead
than RISE, demonstrated by running the Apache web server
and a database server.
Fechner et al. [16] report on preliminary work which is most
related to our proposal. They sketch a technique to permute
instruction opcodes at runtime, in the processor pipeline.
Trusted code will be compiled by a customized toolchain
which transforms the executable instructions according to
the specified permutation. A virus which does not know the
permutation therefore has instructions that are semantically
nonsensical, and likely to cause a runtime failure such as a seg-
mentation fault. The opcode permutation is implemented using
a hardware lookup table. They give simple, preliminary results
to explore how such a lookup table might be integrated into an
instruction decode pipeline stage, using Field-Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA) prototyping. To the best of our knowledge,
they have not followed up on this initial work, to deploy the
scheme in a realistic system.
Ichikawa et al. [17] describe an alternative instruction set
randomization approach, specifically for embedded processors
implemented in FPGA technology. They adopt a pragmatic
approach, to minimize instruction decode complexity. They
identify instructions that have the same bit-level format (e.g.
ADD r1,r2,r3 and SUB r1,r2,r3) and arrange a sub-
stitution cipher encoding between some subset of instructions
sharing the same format. They evaluate this for several stan-
dard instruction sets, including MIPS and JVM bytecode.
While this approach works well for RISC-like instruction
sets with fixed length encodings and a few standard bit-level
layouts, it would not be applicable to variable length x86
instructions.
Sun Microsystems patented a technique[18] which is similar
in some respects. They propose a modifiable microcode dis-
patch table for a machine, such that a permutation of this table
would result in a permuted semantics. The effect of executing
the ADD instruction, could be for instance to dispatch the
microcode of an XOR instruction. If the architecture already
had a modifiable microcode table, then this would introduce
no delay in the pipeline. If, however, the table was additional
to the original design there would clearly be an extra pipeline
stage.
We avoid this extra pipe-line stage, since most instruction
fetches will go to the cache without creating a cache miss.
Only on the relatively small percentage that result in a cache
fail, will there be an extra clock cycle introduced into the
cache load time.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In order to achieve the proposed properties, we present some
ideas, how the goals could be reached. The proposals have to
be further refined.
A. Manufacturing
The primary focus of this work is on processors for embed-
ded systems, typically a System-on-Chip containing a CPU
with additional custom hardware and off-chip RAM and NVM.
The SoC can be implemented either as an ASIC (Application-
specific integrated circuit) or as an FPGA. Typically, the
embedded system will be created by a system integrator and
the design of the SoC will be subcontracted to a design
company. For the ASIC case, the design will typically be
produced by a semiconductor manufacturing company; the
FPGAs can simply be purchased from an FPGA manufacturer.
The system integrator builds and delivers the hardware
system and equips it with an initial software version. Updates
of the software will only be allowed by the manufacturer. The
protocol of the software updating process will be explained
later. The system is open to third party software, which has
to be distributed by the manufacturer, in order to review it,
check for and prevent against malicious code.
The firmware code has to be permuted at the manufacturer
by using the secret key, generated by the PUF of the target
device. This secret key has to be read out by the manufacturer
in the manufacturing process before sealing the hardware and
delivering it. This operation would typically be carried out as
part of the automated testing stage.
B. Software Update Mechanism
The software update process has to be secured in several
ways. Mutual authentication of the communication partners
has to be realised. If authentication was successful the per-
muted software can be sent to the client, secured by a
standardised secure transmission protocol such as TLS with
preshared keys for example. The client stores the encrypted
firmware in his flash memory. Before loading the firmware in
the DRAM for execution decryption has to be done, in order
to fill the DRAM with the permuted firmware code.
C. Command Interface Mechanism
We also propose a protocol for executing different com-
mands on the target platform, for example health check,
status retrieval or a target reboot. Similar to the software
update process mutual authentication is necessary. Afterwards
commands can be executed secured by a standard protocol like
TLS. Figure 3 shows the idea.
IV. ATTACK SCENARIOS
Consider a group of ICS installations produced and man-
aged by a single manufacturer who, by assumption, is using
a hardware-software distribution mechanism modelled on the
one described above. As in any such scenario, an intruder
could attack the installations in many different ways and here
we attempt to examine some of these without pretending to
be exhaustive. We begin by observing that potential attacks
can be usefully categorised in terms of their ambition. With
this in mind, in order of decreasing seriousness, we will use
the following terminology in the subsequent discussion. Each
of these will be related to the applicable information security
CIA principle.
A Category A attack is one which targets the entire group
or a significant subgroup by attempting to infect many or all
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Fig. 3. Command Interface Protocol
of the systems with the same malware. Often such an attack
will employ a deferred payload, meaning that any damage
intended is not inflicted immediately, thus giving the infection
a chance to spread before it is detected. Viruses, worms and
botnet type attacks all fall into this category. This is an attack
on the integrity of the industrial control process.
A Category B attack is less ambitious and tries only to
infect a single machine with malware. Such malware may be
active or passive. Active malware aims to inflict damage but
may also defer its payload to allow the attacker to choose the
best moment to inflict maximum harm. Passive malware aims
to provide the intruder with information or a control capability
which may be used in the future. In all attacks in this category
however, by assumption, there is no intention to spread the
infection beyond the compromised device. This is an attack
on the integrity of the industrial control process.
A Category C attack is less ambitious still and tries only
opportunistically to crash a targeted device. Such an approach
aims at corrupting existing code causing execution failure
rather than attempting the more difficult task of introducing
runnable malware. This is an attack on the availability of the
industrial control process.
A Category D attack does not attempt to affect the opera-
tion of the devices at all, but only to eavesdrop on the system
in such a way as to acquire information. This is an attack on
the confidentiality of the industrial control process.
Attacks in any of these categories may try to exploit vulner-
abilities using one of three broad mechanisms: by attacking the
communications channel, the device site or the manufacturer
site.
We note first that the permuted opcode system makes
Category A attacks all but impossible because code can only
run on a target ICS if its permutation is known and for
this to be possible requires acquiring its secret key. Code
for a given device will not run on any other and so it is
not possible to engineer a virus or worm that can be spread
between devices. There are two obvious ways an attacker
might try to circumvent this inherent immunity. The first is to
steal the manufacturer’s secret key database and subsequently
masquerade as the manufacturer so as to transmit individually
permuted malware to all members of the group. This would
also typically need the manufacturer’s private authentication
credentials as used to establish the secure link. The second is
to inject malware into third party code before it is supplied
to the manufacturer and therefore before it is permuted. If
successful, such pre-infected code might be distributed to the
whole group.
A Category B attack can also only succeed if a device’s
secret key is obtained, again along with the manufacturer’s
private security credentials. Since the key is never transmitted,
a communications channel intrusion is not possible here. It
is also not possible to extract the key from the ICS system
itself without physically accessing and unsealing it: recall that
the PUF mechanism presents the key externally only once, at
manufacture time and is subsequently sealed. Thus a device
site attack will not work either. The only feasible way to obtain
the key required to attack an individual ICS is to gain access
to the manufacturer’s secret key database.
A Category C attack is easier for an attacker to carry out
and can be conducted without gaining access to the secret key.
All that is required is to corrupt code being distributed by the
manufacturer to device sites, and to persuade the device to
install this code, thereby putting it out of action. The only
realistic approach is for the attacker to gain physical access
to the manufacturer or device sites and then to damage code
there or to deliberately corrupt third party code before it
is sent to the manufacturer (although in the latter case this
would presumably crash all devices to which the code was
distributed).
Finally, a Category D attack requires only eavesdropping
on the channel. Since all communications are encrypted, and
both parties must mutually authenticate, we can assume that
direct attacks that require decrypting traffic or masquerading as
manufacturer or device will be infeasible unless an attack from
one of the first two categories has already been successful. The
challenge-response approach to authentication also protects
against replay attacks and conventional encryption methods
against message analysis of, for example, the transmitted code.
Summarising, it can be seen that the primary vulnerabilities
are the manufacturer key database and the possibility of prior
access to third-party code. Thus rigorous protection of the
manufacturer database is crucial, along with the immediate
post-production mechanism whereby the PUF-generated key
is read out from a new device (prior to it being sealed) and
entered into this database. Rigorous examination of third-party
code prior to its distribution, will also obviously be essential
possibly involving careful auditing and pre-testing on examplar
systems at the manufacturer’s site.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a hardware and software based mit-
igation mechanism for resisting malware. Our deployment
platform of interest is ICSs that are particularly vulnerable
to cyber attacks with maximum impact. We have not yet
implemented this system, but propose it here in order to open
a discourse on the feasibility of this solution as a mitigation
strategy.
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